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PEER EFFECTS AND RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF  








The assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of vouchers has been hindered by the lack of 
sufficient empirical evidence. The Chilean education voucher system was established at a national 
scale and has data for more than 15 years.  The empirical literature developed to evaluate the 
voucher system in Chile faced methodological and/or data limitations up until late 1999, since there 
was no individual data available, and papers used the school as a unit of study. Additionally, the 
studies lacked good information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the students. The most 
recent literature uses individual data and introduces the correction for selection bias, but do not take 
into account that some public schools receive additional resources from the government. 
 
In the first section of this paper we control for the amount of per capita funds received by the public 
schools from the government, and find that when public and private voucher schools receive similar 
per capita subsidies, the effect of treatment on the treated (where treatment is attendance to a private 
voucher school) is large in magnitude and statistically significant. Some fear that this result may be 
the consequence of sorting and peer effect, and not of the effectiveness of private voucher schools. 
To analyze the importance of peer effects on the previous results, in the second section we estimate 
new treatment parameters controlling for peer group characteristics. If the positive treatment effect 
estimated earlier were exclusively the result of the sorting process and peer effect, this new 
treatment parameter should be zero. This hypothesis is rejected. Even when we condition on peer 
group characteristics, we find a treatment parameter that is positive, large in magnitude and 
statistically significant, when public and private voucher schools receive similar per capita 
subsidies. Hence, papers that have asserted that positive treatment effects are due to the peer effect 
and/ or sorting are proved wrong. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of vouchers in the financing of social services such as education or health 
continues to be an area of much debate. The advantages and disadvantages of vouchers 
have been analyzed in detail at a theoretical level.  The lack of sufficient empirical evidence 
on the effects of vouchers has hindered the advance of knowledge in this area
1. In Chile a 
voucher system was introduced in education in 1982.  This is the only education voucher 
system established at a national scale and that has data for more than 15 years.  Its 
evaluation is of great interest to evaluate the arguments of the theoretical literature on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the voucher system (and on the proper design of a voucher 
system, an issue whose importance is not sufficiently emphasized in the literature).  
The empirical literature developed to evaluate the voucher system in Chile, in many 
cases faced methodological and/or data limitations
2. Up until late 1999 there was no 
individual data available, and papers used the school as a unit of study (see for example 
Mizala and Romaguera (2000)). Additionally, these studies lacked good information on the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the students, and they were unable to correct for selection 
bias in the estimation of the treatment effects
3. The most recent literature (see for example 
Contreras (2001) and Tokman (2002)) used individual data and introduced the correction 
for selection bias. In general they found significant differences in scores between public 
and private voucher schools. However, they did not take into account that some public 
                                                 
1  See Sapelli (2002). 
 
2  For a discussion of the empirical literature in Chile, see Sapelli and Vial (2002). 
3  Another usual methodological problem in this empirical literature, is the inclusion of school inputs in the 
estimation, confounding the estimation of production functions with the estimation of treatment effects.   4
schools receive additional resources from the government, through municipal transferences 
or through the participation in special government programs. 
In the first section of this paper we present results on the treatment effect associated 
with the attendance to a private voucher school instead of a public one (see Sapelli and 
Vial, 2002). The novelty of our estimation is that we separate geographical areas according 
to the amount of per capita funds received by the public schools from the government. In 
areas where public and private voucher schools receive similar per capita subsidies (where 
private voucher schools receive up to 25% less funds than public schools), we find that the 
effect of treatment on the treated (TT) is large in magnitude and statistically significant.  
Some analysts fear that this result may be the consequence of sorting and peer 
effect, and not the consequence of the effectiveness of private voucher schools. For 
example, Mc Ewan and Carnoy (1998) and Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) argue that the main 
effect of the introduction of vouchers in Chile is sorting. The key problem with those 
studies is the issue of causality.  Hsieh and Urquiola show that higher enrollment in private 
schools coexists with lower test scores in public schools in the same municipality. This 
could be either proof of the peer effect, or not, since entry is endogenous and occurs first 
where municipal schools are doing a poor job (see Hoxby (2001)).  However, the authors 
do not perform a test that explicitly controls for endogeneity. Gallego (2002) finds that the 
issue is crucial: results with and without controlling for endogenous entry differ 
significantly. After controlling for endogeneity, he finds that competition from private 
subsidized schools increase the test scores of municipal schools
4. 
To analyze the importance of peer effects on our results, in the second section we 
estimate new treatment parameters controlling for peer group characteristics. If the positive 
                                                 
4 Note that Gallego obtains the HU results when not controlling for endogenous entry.   5
treatment effect estimated earlier were exclusively the result of the sorting process and peer 
effect, this new treatment parameter should be zero. This hypothesis is rejected using the 
same data set used in the previous estimation. Actually, even when we condition on peer 
group characteristics, we find a positive TT in geographical areas where public and private 
voucher schools receive similar per capita subsidies. In general this new estimation is an 
underestimate of the treatment parameter we would find if we were able to perform the 
proper experiment (see section II). The new treatment parameters estimated corroborate the 
robustness of our previous results. 
 
I. ESTIMATING TREATMENT EFFECTS 
In this section we estimate treatment parameters using the normal model
5. We use 
individual data for the test taken in 1998 to the second grade of secondary school
6. A 
parallel survey that can be matched to test results, produced the data on individual 
socioeconomic characteristics. We also use information on the characteristics of the schools 
and the centrally designed programs in which they participate, and in the transfers they 
receive from municipalities.  
 
Normal Model 
We assume that, given school characteristics, potential test scores in public and 
private voucher schools (Y0  and  Y1 correspondingly) are determined by student’s 
characteristics (including income group, mother and father education, and a dummy 
indicating whether the child comes from an indigenous family).  Public and private voucher 
                                                 
5  For an explanation of the normal model, see Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000). 
6  We present results based on language test scores. The results obtained with math test scores are similar.   6
schools exploit differently those characteristics; so potential test scores in each type of 
school are different.   
We assume that potential test scores can be represented as:  
YD=XβD+uD  
Where D is defined as D=1 if the student chooses a private voucher school, and D=0 if the 
student chooses a public school. The selection rule is defined as follows:  
D=1  if  D*=Zθ+u >0;  D=0  otherwise 
Where  D* denotes the net gain associated with the attendance to the private voucher 
school. 
The vector of observable characteristics affecting school choice, Z, includes the 
variables of the outcome equation, X, in addition to other variables that are supposed to 
affect choice without affecting test scores

















































Then, the average treatment effect (ATE) and the effect of treatment on the treated 
(TT) conditional on X are defined as follows:  
() 0 1 ) ( β β − = X X ATE       
() ( ) ( ) θ λ σ ρ σ ρ β β Z X D Z X TT − − + − = = 0 0 1 1 0 1 ) 1 , , (  
Unconditional parameters are obtained as the average of the conditional parameters over 
the relevant sample as an approximation. Standard errors are computed using parametric 
bootstrapping
8. 
                                                 
7  Those exclusion restrictions are supposed to capture the effect of school availability on the school selection. 
See Sapelli and Vial (2002) for a discussion about the  assumptions behind those exclusion restrictions. 
8  See Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000)   7
 
Controlling for per capita subsidies 
In Chile some schools receive financial assistance from the government above and 
beyond the value of the voucher. Thus, not all the schools considered in the estimation are 
working with the same per capita subsidy. To try and solve this problem, we separate the 
geographical areas according the per capita subsidy received
9. 
We first separate the data set by area of residence, and we estimate the average 
municipal funds transferred to public schools in each geographical area. We then estimate 
the funds received from the central government by public schools in each area. Finally, we 
sort the geographical areas according to the per capita subsidy received by public schools, 
and we construct quintiles (each quintile with approximately 20% of High School 
students)
10. The weighted average (by number of students) of annual transfers per student is 
US$48 in the first quintile; US$64.9 in the second; US$95.6 in the third; US$135.4 in the 
fourth; and US$278.8 in the fifth quintile. This  implies, using US$393.5 as the annual 
standard voucher transfer in 1998, an increase that ranges from 12% in the first quintile and 
of 71% in the fifth
11.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of language test scores by transfer quintile. As we 
can see in the figure, in the first four quintiles the average scores are similar. However, 
students attending public schools in the fifth quintile seem to obtain significantly greater 
test scores.  
                                                 
9 For this purpose we use SUBDERE information on municipal funds transferred to municipal schools, and 
MINEDUC information on school participation in the two most important central government programs for 
High School (Montegrande and PME). See Sapelli and Vial (2002). 
10 We try alternative groups, using information on the funds received by voucher schools. The results obtained 
with those groups are similar to those presented here.  
11 The transfers increase the budget by 12% in quintile 1, 16% in quintile 2, 24% in quintile 3, 34% in quintile 
4 and 71% in quintile 5. 
















Since the first quintile includes public and private voucher schools that work 
approximately within the voucher value, it gives us the most “pure” voucher comparison.  
A possible criticism to this approach is that private voucher schools also receive additional 
financing.  In effect, they can charge fees up to a limit (through a system known as 
“Financiamiento Compartido” (FC), or shared financing). However, in our data set (1998), 
62% of the voucher students attend a FC school; but in the first quintile only 36% of the 
voucher students do. According to the Ministry of Education of Chile
12, the average annual 
fee charged through FC was Ch$55,000 (approximately US$ 121 per year). Hence, the 
                                                 
12 See the web page, www.mineduc.cl. 
Figure 1
Distribution of individual test scores in municipal schools by transfer quintile.





































Average test score in the quintile  9
average per student contribution received through FC, in the first quintile, was Ch$19,800 
(approximately US$ 44 per year).  The additional funds received by public schools from the 
government in the first quintile amount to US$ 48 per student, on average
13. Therefore, it is 
clear that, in the first quintile, public and private voucher schools operate with similar 
budgets even when we include resources received through FC. 
 
Results 
When we run regressions by quintile (see Table 1), we find that students in the first 
3 quintiles have TT results that are positive and statistically significant (i.e. voucher 
students get higher test scores when they attend a private voucher school instead of a public 
one). Even ATE estimates are statistically significant in the first 3 quintiles on average. 
However, for the fifth quintile we obtain ATE and TT estimates that are substantially 
negative. That is, the public schools that receive the most transfers perform substantially 
better than PS schools. This result shows the importance of attempting to appropriately 
incorporate the differences in the supply side. 
The case that most approximates a “pure” voucher system, that of the first quintile, 
shows a TT of 23.7 (0.5 SDs, an effect considered large in the literature). In the second and 





                                                 
13 See Sapelli and Vial (2002).   10
Table 1: ATE and TT on 1998 Language Test Scores 
by transfer quintile (or geographical areas). 
PS-MUN  
 
 ATE  TT 
Average Test Score (ATS)  248.7  248.7 
Test Score Standard Deviation (TSSD)  47.6  47.6 
    
ATE, 1st quintile  5.7  23.7 
standard deviation*  (3.0)  (7.4) 
% of the TSSD  12%  50% 
ATE, 2nd quintile  6.1  14.0 
standard deviation*  (1.4)  (3.0) 
% of the TSSD  13%  29% 
ATE, 3rd quintile  7.4  16.0 
standard deviation*  (1.5)  (4.2) 
% of the TSSD  16%  34% 
ATE, 4th quintile  -3.6  -2.0 
standard deviation*  (1.7)  (2.9) 
% of the TSSD  -7%  -4% 
ATE, 5th quintile  -75.2  -97.6 
Standard deviation*  (2.9)  (3.1) 
% of the TSSD  -158%  -205% 
* Standard Errors are estimated using parametric bootstrapping 
 
 
When we replicate these estimations using 1999 data (for fourth grade of 
elementary school), we obtain a similar pattern of results. Indeed, we find an even larger 
TT for the first quintile, of 42.2 (almost one standard deviation).  
 
II. EVALUATING THE IMPORTANCE OF PEER EFFECTS 
The results described in the preceding section tell us that in areas where public and 
private voucher schools receive similar subsidies, voucher students get higher test scores 
when they attend a private voucher school instead of a public one. Thus, if we imagine an 
experiment moving a student from a private voucher school to a public school (Experiment 
1), our findings show that his/her test score will be reduced.   11
Some analysts fear that those results are the consequence of the sorting process and 
the peer effects associated, and not the consequence of a better performance of private 
voucher schools. In this section we test and reject this hypothesis. 
 
Test formulation 
Consider first two polar scenarios: 
- Case1: Public and Private voucher schools are equally effective providers of 
education, and peer group quality is an important determinant of the student achievement. 
Thus, private voucher schools get better results only due to the sorting process and the peer 
effect associated. Case 1 is consistent with Epple and Romano (1998), who assume that 
achievement,  () b b a a , = , is an increasing function on the student’s ability and the mean 
ability of the student body in the school attended, s (see Epple and Romano (1998), pp. 
36)
14. 
- Case 2: Private voucher schools are more effective in the production of education. 
Peers’ abilities do not affect the student achievement, i.e.,  ( ) s b a a , =  in the previous 
notation. Thus, private voucher schools get better results because they are better. This case 
is consistent with the hypothesis that, since both types of schools face different incentives, 
they exploit differently the student’s characteristics, so potential test scores in each type of 
school are different. 
If Case 1 is true, the positive TT we found in the previous section is the result of the 
sorting process. Since voucher students get better results in private voucher schools only 
                                                 
14  Sapelli (2003) discusses the assumption that only the mean of peer’s ability is important. He argues that 
other moments of the distribution of peer’s ability should affect the student’s achievement. He finds  that a 
larger standard deviation (SD) of ability in schools, implies lower test scores, ceteris paribus.  The issue is 
important, since we cannot change the mean by sorting, but we can lower the average of all schools SD by 
sorting (i.e. average class SD can be much lower than population SD).   12
due to the class composition, if we imagine an experiment moving a voucher student with 
all his classmates to a public school (Experiment 2), we would find no effect on test scores. 
This is the motivation for our test: we control for peer group characteristics in the 
regression  (we include mean and standard deviation of mother’s education in the class) and 
estimate new treatment effects (denoted ATEPEERS and TTPEERS). When we estimate 
TTPEERS we use classmate’s characteristics in the private voucher school to predict test 
scores in the municipal school. Therefore, with TTPEERS we obtain an estimation of the 
result of Experiment 2
15. Then, if Case 1 were true, TTPEERS should be zero. 
If Case 2 is true, the positive TT we found in the previous section reflects that 
Private voucher schools are better (at least for voucher students). But if more educated 
parents choose better schools, we will find better peers attending to better schools. Thus, 
peer group characteristics are related to school type. It follows that when we control for 
peer group characteristics in the regression, we are violating the no-feedback condition for 
treatment effect estimation (see Heckman (2001)). The violation of the no-feedback 
condition implies that if Case 2 were true, TTPEERS should be lower than the treatment 
parameter that was correctly estimated in the previous section. The reason is that better 
peers are related to better schools, so when we condition on peers’ characteristics, part of 
the treatment effect is lost
16. 
If the true case is neither Case 1 nor Case 2 but an intermediate one, TTPEERS is still 
an underestimate of the treatment parameter that we would find if we were able to perform 
Experiment 2. Therefore, in general TTPEERS is neither a good estimate for the treatment 
                                                 
15  A positive TTPEERS shows that the students’ test score should decrease as a result of the Experiment 2.  
16  In the fifth transfer quintile, where municipal schools obtain better results, we expect that TTPEERS will be 
higher than TT estimated in the previous section, because in this case better parents choose municipal schools 
instead of  voucher schools.   13
parameter we are looking for in this section (Experiment 2), nor for the treatment parameter 
we were looking for in the previous section (Experiment 1)
17. But we can think on TTPEERS 
as a lower bound of the treatment parameter that we would find if we were able to perform 
Experiment 2 (which we will denote TT2 from now on). 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the treatment parameters obtained when we control for mean and 
standard deviation of mother’s education in the class
18. The most important result is that we 
still obtain a large and statistically significant TTPEERS in the first transfer quintile. Thus, we 
reject the hypothesis that Case 1 is the true scenario. 
The estimated treatment parameters are remarkably similar to those obtained in the 
previous section, considering that in this estimation we are violating the no-feedback 
condition. As we expected, for the transfer quintiles where we obtained positive TT 
estimates in the previous section (which we will denote TT1 from now on), we obtain 
TTPEERS< TT1






                                                 
17 Note that both experiments a constitute a partial equilibrium analysis. 
18  We also tried with other specifications, and we found similar results. 
19 And in the fifth quintile, where TT1 was negative, we obtain TTPEERS> TT1.   14
Table 2: ATE and TT on 1998 Language Test Scores 
by transfer quintile (or geographical areas), controlling for peers. 
PS-MUN  
 
  ATE  TT 
Average Test Score (ATS)  248.7  248.7 
Test Score Standard Deviation (TSSD)  47.6  47.6 
    
1st quintile  1.5  18.7 
Standard deviation*  (2.5)  (7.7) 
% of the TSSD  3%  39% 
2nd quintile  2.1  6.1 
Standard deviation*  (1.3)  (3.1) 
% of the TSSD  4%  13% 
3rd quintile  3.7  5.9 
Standard deviation*  (2.1)  (4.7) 
% of the TSSD  8%  12% 
4th quintile  -8.3  -11.6 
Standard deviation*  (1.9)  (3.2) 
% of the TSSD  -17%  -24% 
5th quintile  -43.1  -54.5 
Standard deviation*  (4.5)  (5.6) 
% of the TSSD  -90%  -114% 
* Standard Errors are estimated using parametric bootstrapping 
 
 
III. FINAL REMARKS 
The evaluation of a voucher system includes the consideration of several aspects. We focus 
our attention on the relative performance of private and public voucher schools. To evaluate 
the effectiveness of private versus public voucher schools, it is important to compare 
schools with similar budgets. For this purpose we separate geographical areas according to 
the funds received from local and central government in addition to the voucher, and we 
estimate treatment parameters by geographical areas. 
In the second section of the paper we evaluate the importance of peer effects on the 
treatment parameters. We estimate a new treatment effect, the result of an experiment 
moving a student with a all his/her classmates from a private to a public voucher school.   15
This new treatment parameter answers a different question (the outcome of a different 
experiment). Hence, it cannot be considered as a better estimate of the treatment parameter 
estimated in the first section.  If the treatment parameter estimated in the first section were 
exclusively the result of the sorting process and the peer effect, the new treatment 
parameter should be zero. This hypothesis is rejected with our data. 
It is worth noticing that we are not trying to estimate peer effects. We believe that there is a 
lot of work to do on this topic. For instance, it is not clear the way the peer effects operate 
(e.g., are they symmetric?), and how to identify them (due to the causality problem). 
Furthermore, if peer effects are important and the voucher system intensifies the sorting 
process, it is not clear how to evaluate the final outcome. 
Concluding, after controlling for budget differences and for socioeconomic characteristics 
of the students and their peers, we find a new treatment parameter that is positive, large in 
magnitude and statistically significant. The peer effects are not important enough to 
invalidate results that do not take them into consideration, or to change the way we interpret 
those results. Hence, those papers that have implied that positive treatment effects are 
solely due to peer effect and sorting are proved wrong. 
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